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INJUNCTIONS - WHEN ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT WILL BE ENJOINED FOR FRAUD CoNsisTING OF PERJURY - Plaintiffs sought a permanent
injunction against the procurement by defendant. of a judgment upon a workmen's compensation award, on the ground that defendant had obtained the award
through the perjured testimony of himself and his witnesses.1 The false testimony was claimed to be a fraud upon the department of labor and industry
as well as upon the plaintiffs. The lower court dismissed the bill as failing to
state a cause of action. Held, dismissal affirmed since perjury is an intrinsic fraud,
and equitable relief will not be given. Fawcett v. Atherton, 298 Mich. 362,
299 N. W. 108 (1941).
Equity may enjoin the enforcement of prior judgments and decrees on the
ground of fraud, and the time allowed for appeal or for a bill of review of a
judgment has no bearing on this jurisdiction.2 However, there is by no means ·
complete agreement as to what requirements must be satisfied before a court
should exercise this power. The rule most commonly applied 3 is found in
United States v. Throckmorton,4 which held that a court of equity will set aside
a judgment or decree on the ground of fraud only when the fraud is extrinsic, or

1 More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendant was suffering from heart
trouble long before obtaining the award in question, that this was unknown to plaintiffs for more than four years after the final award, that defendant and his medical
examiners testified falsely as to this aspect of defendant's condition, and that the award
to defendant resulted from this false medical history.
2 See the Coke-Ellesmere controversy, over the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery, 1 Ch. Rep. 5, 21 Eng. Rep. 576 (1616), out of which present equity
jurisdiction over fraud is said to have grown. As to the general extent of jurisdiction
over judgments obtained by fraud, see: 15 R. C. L. 760 (1917); 34 C. J. 278
(1924); 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536 (1910); 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 216 (1907); United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
3 15 R. C. L. 762 (1917); 34 C. J. 280 (1924).
4 98 U.S. 61 at 68-69 (1878): "the acts for which a court of equity will on
account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties •••
have relation to frauds, extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and
not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered."
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collateral to the matter tried by the first court. 5 Restricting relief to cases involving extrinsic fraud is the result of an attempt to establish a balance between
the desire to prohibit double vexation and to put an end to litigation, and
the desire to administer ultimate justice. 6 When a judgment has been procured
by the perjured testimony of the successful litigant, one of the most appealing
cases for relief arises. 7 Since the matters fraudulently attested to have been
before the court, since an adversary trial 8 has not been prevented, and since
the judgment has directly adjudicated the matter, the fraud involved is nearly
always intrinsic. Generally, therefore, no relief is given when the fraud consists of perjury.9 Because the results obtained by this rule have at times seemed
particularly harsh, there has recently been a tendency either to disregard it 10
or to find that perjury is an extrinsic fraud. 11 To prevent the artificial determination that perjury is an extrinsic fraud and to avoid the confusion which results
from disregarding the Throckmorton rule in its application to perjury, the
suggestion has been made that the view expressed by Marshall in Marine Insurance Co. v. Hodgson 12 be substituted for the Throckmorton rule.18 Under such
5
34 C. J. 280 (1924); 15 R. C. L. 762 (1917). See particularly: Steele v.
Culver, 157 Mich. 344, 122 N. W. 95 (1909). The Throckmorton case said that the
intrinsic classification was intended to include fraud, not only as to matters actually
before the court, but also as to any matter so in issue that it might have been tried.
Other leading cases to this effect are Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray (68 Mass.) 361
(1854), and La Vasser v. Chesbrough Lumber Co., 190 Mich. 403, 157 N. W. 74
(1916). For criticism of this broad statement, see 126 A. L. R. 390 (1940).
6
5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed.,§ 2077 (656) (1918). See also:
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich.
90, 1 N. W. 1013 (1879); Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537
(1891). But the weight of the argument that the rule is necessary to prevent endless
litigation is perhaps seriously reduced by the experience of Wisconsin, where only four
cases have gone to its supreme court since the rule was abolished in 1914. 23 CAL.
L. REv. 79 at 84 (1935).
7
126 A. L. R. 290 (1940); 22 HARV. L. REv. 600 (1909); 21 CoL. L. REv.
268 (1921).
8
An "adversary trial" is one in which the persons whose interests are involved have
an opportunity to assert their rights. It is characterized by the presence of bona fide
controversy. 126 A. L. R. 390 at 391 (1940). It is particularly distinguished from
e:x: parte proceedings. 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed., § 2077 (656)
(1918).
9
34 C. J. 284 (1924). See also: 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed.,
§ 2077 (1918); 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 216 (1907); and 126 A. L. R. 390 (1940).
10
Publicker v. Shallcross, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 949. But see also
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 899,
where relief was refused on bill of review. Publicker v. Shallcross may easily be
distinguished on its facts from the usual case in that there was perhaps no adversary
trial,-a receiver and not the truly interested person being the only contestant of the
bill on which the decree here under attack was rendered. For other cases disregarding
the rule, see L. R. A. 1916B 890; 126 A. L. R. 390 (1940); 23 CAL. L. REv. 79
(1935); and compilations cited herein.
11
El Reno Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 41 Okla. 297, 137 P. 700 (1913).
12
7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 332 at 336 (1813).
18
126 A. L. R. 390 (1940).
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an approach equity jurisdiction depends on the presence of some fact making
enforcement of the judgment unconscionable, and the injured party, through
no fault of his own or his agents,14 must have been prevented by fraud or accident from availing himself of such fact. Absent any prior equitable adjudication
on the merits, it is also suggested that jurisdiction be taken where the judgments
are founded upon perjury, if the perjury was of controlling importance, was
established by clear proof, and was not, in the exercise of due diligence, discoverable in time for the usual modes of review.15 There seems to be another line
of authority for granting relief more freely where the judgment is based on an
arbitration award.16 In the principal case the argument might be advanced that
similar reasoning should apply to judgments taken upon decisions of administrative tribunals, although for Michigan this argument would seem to have been
obviated by Columbia Casualty Co. v. Klettke. 11 It was not until the principal
case, however, that all doubts were resolved.18 The court then disposed of the
question squarely on the authority of Columbia Casualty Co. v. Klettke, quoting
from that case a passage from Pomeroy 19 which summarizes concisely the traditional view of the problem in its broadest form, and expressly recognizes that,
"although often a party will lose valuable rights," 20 and "occasional miscarriages
of justice" 21 will result, still the possibility of "endless litigation" must be precluded.

14 It is not an unfamiliar proposition that the negligence of an agent may be imputed to the principal nor that an attorney may be an agent of his client. 7 C. J. S.
850 (1937); 34 C. J. 307 (1924); note possible application in Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal.
129, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537 (1891).
15 126 A. L. R. 390 (1940); L. R. A. 1916B 890.
16 "This distinction has been based on the ground that the informality of arbitration entitles the resultant judgment to a lesser degree of respect." 49 HARV. L. REV.
327 (1935). But see Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter Grain Co., 217 Mo. App. 187,
274 S. W. 901 (1925), which holds that parties assume the risk of informal procedure.
17 259 Mich. 564, 244 N. W. 164 (1931).
18 Previous Michigan cases contain elements which detract from their strength
as authority on this point. In Gray v. Barton, 62 Mich. 186, 28 N. W. 813 (1886),
plaintiff had ample opportunity to present his case in the original proceeding. In
Cleveland Iron Mining Co. v. Husby, 72 Mich. 61, 20 N. W. 168 (1888), plaintiff
relied, for proof of the perjury, solely on the affidavit of the perjurer. In Columbia
Casualty Co. v. Klettke, 259 Mich. 564, 244 N. W. 164 (1934), defendant countered
plaintiff's charge of perjury as to marriage with deceased by offering to prove commonlaw marriage, and thus to show perjury was not of controlling importance in the first
proceedings. Although these grounds of distinction may seem slight, obviously they
present elements which detract from plaintiff's equitable position at a time when he
needs all the equities he can muster.
19 5 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,§ 20?7 (656), p. 4683 (1918).
20 Id.
21 Id., quoting from Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537 (1891).

